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Note to the reader: this is a paper I wrote in the summer of 2015. I shopped it around to a few 
journals, but without success. I then realized that Ori Herstein had published a paper that 
comes to a very similar conclusion (https://philpapers.org/rec/HERUSP), and so I put this 
project on indefinite hold. But I’m still a fan of some of the arguments in the paper, so I thought 
I’d put it up on PhilPapers for safekeeping. 
 
 
Abstract 
Although it is widely accepted that hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame others who 
have committed similar wrongs, an account of what it is that’s lost when someone loses their 
standing to blame remains elusive. When moral address is inappropriate because it is or would be 
hypocritical, what is the precise nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise, 
and that so often gets voiced as “I don’t have to take that from you”? In this paper I argue that 
extant answers to this question fall short, and I offer a novel account that takes seriously the 
thought that hypocrisy somehow silences the blame of the hypocrite. To make sense of this 
silencing effect, I argue that we need to look closely at the role that second-personal reasons play 
in moral address.  
 
1. 
 
At the dinner table not long ago, my daughter was going to great lengths, as only a 4-year-old can 
do, to avoid eating her asparagus. My partner and I, on the other hand, were going to great lengths 
to try to convince her otherwise, saying that it was both delicious and also a very small piece. 
(Though on second thought those points seem to be in tension with one another.) Finally, when 
it became clear that rational persuasion was hopeless (as it usually is when the issue is vegetables), 
we played a variant of the “because I said so” card. As my daughter was getting set to leave the 
table, asparagus still on her plate, my partner said, “Oh, we can’t be finished with dinner until we 
eat our asparagus. Everyone has to eat their asparagus.” To which my daughter responded in all 
earnestness: “Even the neighbors?” 
 It was a funny moment for at least two reasons. One was simply the fact that my daughter’s 
innocence had made her overlook the implicitly restricted use of the word ‘everyone’. But there’s 
another aspect of my daughter’s innocence here, too, which is this: although my partner and I can 
sometimes legitimately play the “because I said so” card with our daughter, we certainly can’t play 
that card with our neighbors. Through her innocent ignorance of the normative structure of 
ordinary interpersonal relationships, my daughter is constantly reminding me of how complex that 
structure is, and making me laugh in the process. 
 But the joke here is connected to a broader moral phenomenon that is worth exploring in 
detail. The phenomenon I have in mind is this: sometimes it is inappropriate for me to blame you 
for what you’ve done, even if you are blameworthy for doing it. In what has now become the 
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standard terminology: even if you are blameworthy for something you’ve done, I may lack the 
standing to blame you for doing it.1 In such a situation, if I nevertheless try to blame you, it seems 
that you are entitled to raise some sort of complaint against me. If, for example, I lack the standing 
to blame you because I am guilty of a similar transgression, then you might say, “Look who’s 
talking”. And that, in some sense, is all you would need to say to shut me up. 
 In my experience, this sort of retort can be very effective as an explicit response to verbalized 
blame, but it can also work more abstractly through our recognition that it is a possible move 
through moral space. Knowing that there’s some sort of impropriety involved in hypocritical blame 
can effectively shut down blame from would-be hypocrites before it gets voiced at all. “Yes, I agree 
that they are doing something wrong,” I might say to a third party, “but I’m in no position to 
blame them for it.” 
But what exactly is the nature of the complaint that you are entitled to make, the 
anticipation of which might keep me from voicing my blame in the first place? By hypothesis, your 
complaint is not that you have been falsely accused, since the retort in question seems in order even 
if your guilt is common knowledge. Rather, your complaint is that I am also guilty. But how is that 
relevant? As Macalester Bell points out: “The educational or motivational value of blame is not 
undermined by the blamer's hypocrisy; we can learn from the morally corrupt just as we can learn 
from the morally pure” (Bell 2013: 275). Nevertheless, a hypocritical blamer seems, in some sense, 
to have lost their moral voice. But what exactly does that mean? Although many theorists now 
acknowledge that we need to grapple with the notion of standing in order to understand the ethics 
of blame, no one has yet attempted to articulate what it is that’s lost when someone loses their 
standing to blame. In what follows I make an attempt, guided by my daughter’s refusal to eat her 
asparagus. 
 
2. 
Let’s begin by bringing the relevant phenomenon into sharper focus. Suppose that I report to you 
that your friend Joshua has just published a paper that contains an astoundingly uncharitable 
reconstruction of one of your arguments. Upon hearing this news, you might blame Joshua (or 
express your blame, depending on how exactly you like to conceptualize these things) in several 
different ways: you might simply lower your opinion of his work, or you might get angry with him, 
or you might send him an annoyed email, or you might call him and give him an earful, or perhaps 
you could adopt a policy of summarily rejecting every paper that you’re asked to referee which 
seems likely to have been written by him. Depending on the details of the case, there are several 
ways in which your blame here could be inappropriate, and it will be useful to go through a few of 
them as a way of isolating the one that will matter to us as we move forward. 
 Perhaps the most obvious way your blame could misfire is if it turns out that I’m wrong: it 
wasn’t Joshua who published the paper after all, or perhaps it was him but the reconstruction wasn’t 
uncharitable. If either of these facts comes to light, then your blame is inappropriate because Joshua 
isn’t blameworthy, after all. But now suppose that it was Joshua, and it was uncharitable. Still, your 
blame might misfire. If it turns out that since its publication Joshua has had a change of heart and 
has sent a retraction request to the journal in question, and further has called you to apologize, 
 
1 See, for example, Cohen 2006, Smith 2007, and Friedman 2013, among others that I’ll discuss in more detail 
below. 
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then at the very least the intensity of your blame ought to be tempered.2 If you continue to act on 
your policy to summarily reject all papers that might be written by him, then arguably this way of 
blaming is inappropriate because it is disproportionate to the facts. But now suppose that it was 
Joshua, it was uncharitable, and your blame is in proportion to the severity of the wrong. Still, your 
blame might be inappropriate if you know that I am notorious for giving bogus testimony, and the 
only reason you have for thinking that Joshua published the paper in question is the fact that I told 
you so. In this case your blame is arguably inappropriate because it is epistemically irresponsible.3 
 But I don’t want to focus on any of those ways that your blame might be inappropriate. 
Instead, suppose that it was Joshua, it was uncharitable, your blame is in proportion to the severity 
of the wrong, and you have plenty of good evidence for thinking that Joshua is in fact blameworthy 
(perhaps you’ve now read the paper yourself). However, suppose further that you yourself routinely 
publish astoundingly uncharitable reconstructions of the arguments of other philosophers. As your 
friend, if I find out that you are going to go give Joshua a piece of your mind, I might gently point 
out your hypocrisy in doing so. And I might even manage to convince you that you’ve got no right 
to get worked up about Joshua’s paper. What I would have convinced you of in this case is that 
your blame is inappropriate because, in this instance, you lack the standing to blame. It is this sort 
of inappropriate blame – standingless blame – that I want to focus on. 
 Still, there may be various ways to lose one’s standing to blame. Hypocrisy is perhaps the 
clearest case (or, more precisely, the fact that one’s blame would be hypocritical), but complicity is 
also usually mentioned in the same breath.4 Suppose, for example, that Joshua and I co-authored 
the paper in which the uncharitable reconstruction occurs. Assuming we shared responsibility for 
the reconstruction, it would be inappropriate for me to blame Joshua for the lack of charity. I’m 
too involved in the relevant wrong to have the standing to blame Joshua for it, even if Joshua is 
equally blameworthy for it – or so it seems. Then perhaps, too, someone can lack the standing to 
blame if the wrong in question is simply none of one’s business, or if the wrongdoer is someone to 
whom one doesn’t stand in any relevant relationship.5 Joshua’s partner can perhaps blame him, and 
maybe his parents can, and you can, but it would seem at the least very odd if a perfect stranger 
were to chew him out for his lack of charity.6 In each of these cases – the cases of hypocritical, 
complicit, and meddling blame – it seems like Joshua is entitled to retort, “Who are you to blame 
me for this?” And it’s this question that, when appropriate, seems to indicate a lack of standing. 
 However, for the sake of keeping our focus, I propose to restrict the discussion to cases of 
hypocritical blame. I’m optimistic that the lessons will be applicable more broadly, but I don’t 
intend to argue for that here. So, our question is this: when blame is inappropriate because it is or 
would be hypocritical, what is the nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise? 
 
2 Smith 2007 contains a nice discussion of the role that this sort of consideration (i.e., the agent’s own response to 
their wrongdoing) might play in tempering one’s blame. 
3 D. Justin Coates articulates and argues for a version of this view in his 2016. 
4 See, in particular, Cohen 2006 and Watson 2015. But complicity may, perhaps, ultimately reduce to a form of 
hypocrisy. See also Todd 2012. 
5 See Radzik 2011 for a nice discussion of the moral importance of minding one’s own business. 
6 There’s a Golden Girls episode that nicely illustrates this phenomenon. Faced with a lawsuit from the city of 
Miami for having too many renters under one roof, Rose suggests kicking Dorothy’s mother Sophia out of the 
house. Offended, Dorothy responds, “Well, thank you very much!”, and then invoking her special relationship to her 
own mother to comedic effect, she adds, “But if anybody is going to put my mother out in the cold, it’s going to be 
me.” 
 
 4 
An answer to this question will help us to figure out what it is that’s lost when someone loses the 
standing to blame, and hence what the notion of standing is in the first place. 
 
3. 
But before we can begin considering candidate answers to this question, there’s one more way in 
which the question needs to be clarified and, as a result, restricted. I’ve tried to distinguish 
standingless blame from other ways in which blame can be inappropriate, but we might still 
wonder, of the wide range of responses that might count as blame, which are thus rendered 
inappropriate by hypocrisy and whether the nature of the complaint might differ depending on 
which sort of response we have in mind. Broadly speaking, we can divide blaming responses into 
three categories (we’ll call them ‘blaming responses’ so as not to prejudge the question of the precise 
nature of blame itself) based on whether they are judgings, feelings, or doings.7 The issue of standing 
might crop up in any of these three categories, and it will prove useful – again, for the sake of focus 
– briefly to consider how. 
 Consider the category of judgings first. Here I have in mind beliefs formed about a 
wrongdoer in response to their wrong, beliefs such as “He’s a jerk” or “He deserves to be punished 
for that” or “He just broke a promise for no good reason”. It’s controversial whether beliefs like 
this count as blame if they are never expressed in words or actions, but that controversy is irrelevant 
for our purposes, since forming these beliefs is obviously closely related to, if not a way of, blaming.8 
And it’s not hard to think of cases where, plausibly, someone lacks the standing even to form (or 
at least to take an active role in forming) beliefs like this. I think here in particular of the judgmental 
parent, who is always on the lookout for ways in which her son-in-law is falling short of her ideals 
with respect to, say, proper lawn maintenance. Plausibly, how well her son-in-law cares for his 
lawn is none of her business, and so it is inappropriate (meddlesome, perhaps) for her even to be 
forming judgments about it.9 We might even imagine her expressing these judgments to a friend 
over coffee, and her friend thinking it bizarre and unloving for her to be oriented such that those 
things are even on her radar in the first place. The worry here might plausibly be spelled out as a 
worry about standing, but I won’t dwell on it anymore, because in what follows I won’t be 
concerned primarily with the category of judgings. 
 Consider next the category of feelings. Arguably the most widely accepted account of blame 
is the one championed by R. Jay Wallace (1994), who takes his inspiration from P. F. Strawson’s 
(1962) emphasis on the role that the moral emotions have in our interpersonal relationships. For 
Wallace, to blame someone just is to feel resentment (or indignation, or guilt) toward the person 
as a result of their wrongdoing, or to judge that such an emotion would be appropriate. Again, 
though, whatever your favored account of blame, it’s uncontroversial that paradigmatic blaming 
scenarios involve some sort of emotional or affective response that targets the person blamed. 
Might a worry about standing arise here, even if the relevant emotional response remains 
completely hidden from the view of the person being targeted (i.e., even in cases of what we might 
call “unexpressed blame”)? I think the answer is yes, perhaps because the wrong in question is “no 
 
7 See Coates & Tognazzini 2014 for a more careful articulation of the structure of blaming responses and the 
surrounding ethical issues. 
8 Hieronymi 2004 makes a strong case for the claim that judgings can carry the characteristic sting of blame, and 
hence are a way of blaming. See also Watson 1996. 
9 Watson 2013 is a compelling exploration of the vice of judgmentalism. 
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proper concern of yours” (Wertheimer 1998: 499).10 But unexpressed resentment might be 
inappropriate for reasons of hypocrisy, as well. Again, it helps to imagine a conversation with a 
third party, who, upon noticing that you are beginning to seethe with resentment, gently points 
out that you are chronic offender of exactly the same type as the person you are targeting with that 
resentment. Even if you never express it to the person you are blaming, your blame nevertheless 
seems inappropriate because you lack the standing, in this case, even to feel resentment. Again, 
though, I want to set the case of unexpressed resentment to one side, for the sake of focusing on 
what strikes me as the central sort of case in which issues of standing arise: blame that is explicitly 
addressed to the person blamed, or what we might call “expressed blame”. 
 The sorts of cases that will be the focus of my analysis are cases where the blamer is engaged 
in some sort of rebuke or verbal expression of blame or some clear modification of the relationship 
with the person blamed (e.g., a noticeably decreased willingness to hang out on a regular basis, or 
an unmistakably cold shoulder). It is when these sorts of interaction are hypocritical that the retort 
about standing seems to have the most force, when the person blamed can most clearly say, “You 
have no right to say that to me”, or “That’s rich coming from you”.11 Again, although I’m optimistic 
that the account of lost standing developed below can bear fruit for the unexpressed cases (a 
question I hope to take up in future work), I think it is worth narrowing our focus here, both 
because it makes for a cleaner discussion and also because I want to leave open the possibility that 
the challenge to standing just means something completely different depending on the precise 
blaming response in question. So, again, we’ll focus here on cases of overt hypocritical blame, or 
what Wallace (2010) has called “hypocritical moral address”.12 
 
4. 
Our question, now adequately refined, is: when moral address is inappropriate because it is or 
would be hypocritical, what is the nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise? 
I’ve found four answers to this question in the literature, but in my view none is completely 
satisfactory. To see why, let’s go through them one by one. 
T. M. Scanlon (2008, 2013) has recently offered a compelling account of the nature of 
blame, where blaming someone is a matter of recognizing that the wrongdoer’s action has impaired 
one’s relationship with the wrongdoer, and then altering one’s relationship with the wrongdoer in 
light of the recognition of that impairment. For Scanlon, no particular emotional response is 
necessary, though of course moral emotions like resentment and indignation will be concomitants 
of blame. There is much to recommend this account as an understanding of moral blame, but what 
 
10 The full quotation is worth your time: “If the harm isn’t gross or the injustice egregious (no crime against 
humanity), if our concern, though earnest, is idle, then high-minded indignation has odors of moral self-indulgence 
if it’s unprompted by institutional or communal affiliations, or personal attachments or identifications with the 
victims, or some stake in the issues. Some matters -- like other folks’ intimate intrafamilial relations -- may be none 
of your business, not your affair, no (proper) concern of yours, so, whatever your evidence and emotions, it is not 
your place to bear ill will. Persons with ties to the principals may have better claim to a concern that could justify ill 
will than persons connected purely by principles” (Wertheimer 1998: 499). 
11 Thus Gerald Dworkin says that the issue of standing is about “who can say what to whom” (Dworkin 2000: 182). 
12 Strictly speaking, Wallace distinguishes between two modes of hypocritical moral address: advice and criticism. 
What he is most interested in, and what I am focusing on here, is hypocritical moral address in the mode of moral 
criticism. The connection between criticism and advice will come up later, however, as it provides a nice way to test 
the hypothesis about standing that I’m about to present. 
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we’re interested in is the answer this account allows him to give to our main question. For Scanlon, 
what exactly is the problem with hypocritical moral address? 
Since moral blame, for Scanlon, is a matter of altering one’s relationship with the 
wrongdoer in light of the recognition that the wrongdoer has impaired the relationship through 
their wrongdoing, blame communicates to the wrongdoer that the relevant impairment in the 
relationship is the direct result of the wrongdoer’s actions. But in cases of hypocritical blame, says 
Scanlon, this is a false message. As he puts it, “There is something false in my suggesting that it is 
your willingness to act in ways that indicate untrustworthiness that impairs our moral relationship” 
(Scanlon 2008: 177, original emphasis). Since “normal moral relations” are constituted by mutually 
held intentions and expectations, our relationship was in fact already impaired in the relevant sense 
by my own wrongdoing, and thus “there is something false” in the suggestion carried by my blame 
that you are the one who impaired it. 
One way of describing the issue here is to say that for Scanlon, the problem with 
hypocritical moral address is that it is unfitting: it represents the world in a way that doesn’t “fit” 
how the world actually is. (False beliefs are unfitting in this sense, but the notion of fittingness is 
broader, potentially applying to other states like emotions and, as it does here, to actions, or the 
meanings carried by actions, as well.13) 
It may be true that hypocritical moral address is unfitting, but I don’t think the idea of 
fittingness gives us the answer to our primary question. What we’re interested in is the nature of 
the complaint that the person who is hypocritically blamed is entitled to raise. And on Scanlon’s 
account it looks like the complaint is merely, “What you’ve said (or implied) is false.” But this is 
the same sort of complaint that is raised when the person who is blamed offers an excuse or a 
justification for what they’ve done. Since blame also implies that the person blamed is 
blameworthy, I can attempt to escape blame by pointing out that my action didn’t actually violate 
the relevant norm, or perhaps that although it did violate the norm, the circumstances of my 
wrongdoing made it unreasonable to expect me to do anything else. These moves in the blaming 
conversation also amount to the claim that the blamer has said or implied something false, but 
what we’re interested in is what’s distinctive about the retort that challenges a blamer’s standing to 
blame. Scanlon has articulated another way that blame can fail to fit the facts (besides targeting 
someone who is not in fact blameworthy), but the relevant retort about standing seems to be 
something more forceful and distinctive than the mere claim that blame is unfitting.14 
R. Jay Wallace has also treated the problem of hypocritical moral address in detail, and in 
his view what’s crucial is that the objection to the hypocritical blamer is a moral objection. 
Hypocrisy in general is morally problematic, and in Wallace’s view, the fundamental form of 
hypocrisy – the one that provides the foundation for an understanding of other morally problematic 
forms of hypocrisy – is the one found in hypocritical moral address. This connection that Wallace 
 
13 On the notion of fittingness, and how it differs from other ways in which moral responses might be appropriate, 
see D’Arms & Jacobson 2000. 
14 On second thought, perhaps the problem with hypocritical moral address, for Scanlon, is identical to the problem 
with blaming someone who is not blameworthy. If judging that someone is blameworthy is a matter of judging that 
they have done something to impair their relationship with you, as Scanlon contends, then the problem with 
hypocritical moral address is that it implies that the person who is blamed is blameworthy, when in fact they are not 
(since the relationship was already impaired by the blamer’s previous attitudes and behavior). But again, the issue of 
standing seems like something distinct from the issue of blaming someone who isn’t blameworthy, so this is more 
reason to look elsewhere for an adequate account of standing. 
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finds between hypocritical moral address and hypocrisy more generally is what leads him to think 
that the objection to hypocritical moral address must be a moral objection, as well. But what precise 
objection is it? 
 Recall that for Wallace, blame is intimately tied with the moral emotions of resentment, 
indignation, and guilt. This is because a disposition to feel these emotions – emotions which 
express disapproval and opprobrium – is constitutive of “[caring] about the values at the heart of 
morality” (Wallace 2010: 324), and a blameworthy person has flouted those values. But the moral 
emotions are more than just vehicles for expressing one’s disappointment at a moral violation; they 
can also be “vehicles for moral insight and improvement” (Wallace 2010: 326) since experiencing 
them can make one aware of what a particular moral wrong looks like, and thus can make one 
aware of ways in which one has violated moral values oneself. And what this shows us, according 
to Wallace, is that hypocritical blame is problematic only to the extent that the blamer fails to 
“[subject their] own attitudes and behavior to critical assessment, and [bring] them into harmony 
with [the blamer’s] current reactions to the attitudes and behavior of others” (Wallace 2010: 326). 
When hypocritical blame is morally objectionable, then, it’s because I try to make an exception for 
myself. As Wallace (2010: 328) puts it: 
Suppose I blame you for your dishonesty when I have regularly been dishonest in my 
interactions with you, and suppose I also fail to reflect on and come to terms with my 
dishonest behavior in the past…[In this case], I treat your dishonesty as a license to 
disregard your interest in avoiding social disapprobation. But I also act as if I continue to 
deserve protection from the same effect myself, despite the fact that I have been dishonest 
toward you in just the same way. As long as it goes uncorrected, this complex stance 
attaches to my interests greater importance than it ascribes to yours, affording my interests 
a higher standard of protection and consideration than it affords to yours. This offends 
against a presumption in favor of the equal standing of persons that I take to be 
fundamental to moral thought. 
In cases of morally objectionable hypocritical blame, the blamer wants to shield himself from blame 
but does not extend the same opportunity to the person he blames, which is a violation of a 
fundamental moral principle. The objection that the person who is hypocritically blamed can raise, 
then, is that the hypocritical blamer has done something morally wrong.15 
 Again, though, while it may be true that this sort of unreflective hypocritical moral address 
is morally wrong, I don’t think this fact gives us the answer to our primary question. For one thing, 
the relevant objection to the standing of the hypocritical blamer may be in order even if the 
hypocritical blamer also blames himself. Take, for example, the case of Barack Obama’s views on 
same-sex marriage. In 2008 Obama was against legalizing same-sex marriage, but over the next 
several years his views evolved until he announced in 2012 that he had changed his mind. (And 
when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015, the White House lit up in 
rainbow colors.) Let’s assume that Obama’s change of mind was the result of sincere soul-
searching, and let’s not try to specify the precise statute of limitations on a sincere belief that would 
render the assertion of its negation evidence of a changed mind rather than evidence of hypocrisy. 
 
15 Similar accounts of the objection to standingless blame can be found in Duff 2010, Tadros 2009, and Lippert-
Rassmussen 2013. 
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Instead, let’s imagine that shortly after changing his mind, Obama is in conversation with a 
Republican colleague who voices opposition to same-sex marriage. And suppose that in response, 
Obama experiences the sort of emotional response characteristic of blame (and the disposition to 
which constitutes caring about the relevant moral values), and voices his blame to the colleague. 
Isn’t the colleague entitled to some sort of complaint about Obama’s standing? Can’t he say to 
Obama, “You’ve got no right to be upset with me or think poorly of me, since not too long ago 
you yourself espoused exactly the same views that I do”? 
 Or, to approach the same situation from a different perspective: upon hearing his 
Republican colleague voice opposition to same-sex marriage, what should Obama’s response be? 
Would it be appropriate for Obama to feel and express resentment? By hypothesis, Obama regrets 
his previous position on these issues and blames himself for his previous views, so if he were to 
experience and express resentment, he wouldn’t be trying to make an exception for himself. His 
blame wouldn’t be morally objectionable, at least not for the reasons that Wallace thinks 
hypocritical moral address is morally objectionable. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it would still 
be inappropriate for Obama to be emotionally exercised in the way characteristic of blame, and 
certainly inappropriate for him to rebuke his colleague. Given Obama’s recent history, a much 
more measured response seems called for, perhaps something along the lines of: “I used to feel that 
way, too, but you know what? After much deliberation, I changed my mind. Can I tell you why I 
disagree?” Even supposing that opposition to legalizing same-sex marriage is objectionable and 
that the Republican colleague is in the wrong, it nevertheless seems like Obama in particular is not 
in a position to blame his colleague, at least not in the same way in which, say, a lifelong supporter 
of same-sex marriage could do so. Why not? Well, what else could it be other than that Obama 
lacks the standing to blame, given how recently he changed his mind? But if Obama lacks the 
standing to blame in this case, even though blaming would not be morally objectionable, then 
complaints about standing are not best understood as accusations of morally objectionable 
blaming.16 
 But even if I’m wrong that a hypocritical blamer who blames himself can nevertheless lack 
the standing to blame, I still think that the complaint about standing to which the blamed person 
is entitled is not merely the complaint that the blamer is also doing something morally wrong. The 
complaint, when it is raised by someone who is being hypocritically blamed, is supposed to tell us 
something about how the blamed individual should (or can) respond to the blame she is receiving. 
As G. A. Cohen (2013) puts it, the complaint about standing is meant to be a way of “silencing” 
one’s critics. And while pointing out that the hypocritical blamer is doing something morally 
wrong may convince him to stop blaming you, it may also simply convince him that he should be 
blaming himself as well, in which case it’s hard to see exactly what the “silencing” effect would 
amount to. The relevant force of saying, “I don’t have to take that from you”, isn’t merely that the 
hypocritical blamer ought to stop blaming or else blame himself; it’s that even if the hypocritical 
blamer continues with blame, the blame is somehow irrelevant or impertinent or something that can 
be ignored. Again, as Cohen puts it, the relevant complaint is supposed to “disable moral 
condemnation” (Cohen 2013: 134). Pointing out that the hypocritical blamer is doing something 
morally wrong might, as a matter of fact, convince him to stop blaming you, but the complaint 
 
16 Or, more precisely: the complaint can’t be that in blaming, Obama is seeking to make an exception for himself. 
Perhaps Obama’s blame could be morally objectionable for other reasons, but I’m inclined to think we’d be able to 
alter the example accordingly so that it would do the same work. 
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about standing is supposed to have more force than that. It’s doesn’t serve merely to stop the blame 
from happening, but to disable the blame in some way. An account of this disabling or silencing 
effect is what we set out to find, and it still eludes us. 
Gerald Dworkin (2000) gets us a bit closer. His account begins with the observation that 
blame, especially expressed blame, has a point, namely “to have the person make some change in 
behavior, or dispositions, or character traits” (Dworkin 2000: 186). (This is one of its points, at 
least.) But typically, in order for a wrongdoer to be moved toward reform by someone’s blame, the 
blamer must be someone whose opinions the wrongdoer cares about. And it is this insight that, 
according to Dworkin, allows us to see what lies behind the complaint about standingless blame. 
As he puts it (2000: 187): 
 
The idea here is that the sanctions of morality—censure, ostracism, blame, disapproval, 
disgust—operate effectively only when they resonate with the person being sanctioned. 
The target of criticism feels that she is being distanced from a person, or a moral 
community, that she sees as legitimate and worthy. It is not sufficient that the criticism be 
correct or accurate. It must come from a source whose criticism I care about. It is because 
the criticism causes me to lose status in the eyes of the person who makes the criticism that 
it moves me. 
Now we have an explanation for the requirement. When the person who calls 
attention to my character fault suffers from the very same fault, this puts him on a par with 
me—with respect to this fault at least. If I lose respect in his eyes because of the presence 
of this fault, he must lose respect in my eyes as well. But this means that I do not care as 
much whether he disapproves of my conduct. And this means that the criticism cannot be 
as effective as it normally would have been. 
 
Since “we value being valued by those we value”, blame is often effective at getting wrongdoers to 
shape up. But standingless blame fails to offer the wrongdoer the proper motivation, and this is 
the sense in which it is inappropriate. When a wrongdoer offers the complaint about standing – 
“Who are you to blame me?” – she is pointing out that the hypocritical blamer’s blame will not in 
fact motivate her to shape up. 
 Like I said, I think this gets us closer because it takes seriously the “silencing” effect that 
the relevant complaint is supposed to have. Standingless blame doesn’t just mean something for 
the blamer – that he is doing something unfitting or morally objectionable, for example – but it 
also means something for the person being blamed, that he “doesn’t have to take it” when it comes 
from a hypocrite. But the account that Dworkin gives of this further element is too incidental. He 
is surely right that, as a matter of fact, the person who is being hypocritically blamed is much less 
likely to be motivated by the blame to shape up, and in that sense hypocritical blame will fail to 
achieve one of the primary aims of blame. But the relevant complaint is stronger than this. It’s not 
merely, “Your blame doesn’t motivate me.” Rather, it’s, “I’m right not to be motivated by your 
blame”, or “I shouldn’t be motivated by your blame.” It’s not merely, “I won’t take it from you”; 
rather, it’s “I don’t have to take it from you”. So although Dworkin is in the ballpark, we need 
something that captures the normativity.17 
 
17 Moreover, even if the person being hypocritically blamed is thereby motivated to change their ways, this would be 
in spite of the fact that the hypocritical blamer lacks standing. Thanks to Philip Swenson for this point. 
 10 
Macalester Bell (2013) gets us even closer. Although she is skeptical of the notion of 
standing in general, she nevertheless does a nice job of articulating the account that she is skeptical 
of, and it will prove instructive for us to consider it here. As she sees it, the challenge to standing 
is an attempt to dismiss the blame, where this is spelled out in terms of whether the hypocritical 
blamer’s blame provides the person blamed with a reason to shape up. This gives us the normativity 
that was lacking in Dworkin’s account – it’s not just that the blamed person won’t respect or be 
motivated by the hypocritical blamer’s blame; it’s also that the hypocritical blame provides the 
person blamed with no reason to shape up. So if you lack standing, Bell says, then “[your] reproach 
necessarily lacks moral propriety and may be dismissed without consideration of its content” (Bell 
2013: 264). 
 As I said, Bell herself is skeptical that challenges to standing are ever legitimate, and this 
is because they smack of the ad hominem fallacy. We have to distinguish between the person who is 
blaming, on the one hand, and the content of the blame, on the other. Once we do that, Bell says, 
we can see that the challenge to standing moves illegitimately from a critique of the person issuing 
the blame – namely, “You’re a hypocrite” – to a dismissal of the content of their blame – namely, 
“Your blame doesn’t give me a reason to shape up”. But this move is clearly illegitimate. Regardless 
of the moral record of the blamer, the content of the blame may still have very important lessons 
to teach us. Bell says, “The educational or motivational value of blame is not undermined by the 
blamer’s hypocrisy; we can learn from the morally corrupt just as we can learn from the morally 
pure” (Bell 2013: 275). A bit later on she echoes this sentiment: “Targets of blame should resist 
the temptation to try to undermine criticism by bringing up the moral record of the criticizer. 
While it can be hard to hear, we often have reason to give uptake to criticism voiced by the morally 
flawed” (Bell 2013: 280). Bell rightly points out that blame has a number of aims, including the 
education of the wrongdoer and the avoidance of condonation on the part of the blamer. As long 
as the blame is fitting and achieves one of its aims, then, Bell says, the blame is morally appropriate 
(Bell 2013: 272). Since hypocritical blame can still manage to achieve some of the aims of blame, 
there is nothing morally untoward about it, and thus it is misguided to raise any worries about the 
blamer’s standing. 
 Although I agree with much of what Bell says, I disagree with the lesson that she draws. 
She is surely right that the content of hypocritical blame can nevertheless be instructive, and we 
would do well to pay attention to it and take it seriously. She’s also surely right that blame has 
multiple aims, and that even hypocritical blame can manage to achieve at least some of its many 
aims. Nevertheless, it seems to me that she misconstrues the nature of the complaint about 
standing. She construes it as an attempt to dismiss the content of the blame, and this leads her to 
think that it smacks of an ad hominem. But in its most familiar manifestations, the complaint about 
standing isn’t an attempt to dismiss the content; rather, it’s an attempt to dismiss (or silence) the 
blamer. The complaint, after all, isn’t that the blame is off-target, and we don’t even need to 
suppose that the person who is being blamed is uninterested in shaping up. The relevant complaint 
can be raised even if the person raising it isn’t trying to get off the hook, broadly speaking. What 
the complainant is saying, instead, is that even if they are on the hook, they aren’t on the blamer’s 
hook. Alternatively: that even if they agree that they need to answer for their wrongdoing, they 
don’t need to answer to the blamer. Because Bell focuses on the content of the blame rather than 
on the blamer’s relationship to the person being blamed, she is led to skepticism about the 
challenge to standing. So what we need to avoid such skepticism is a way of understanding how 
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the person being blamed can dismiss the blamer without thereby dismissing what the blamer has 
to say. And now, I think, we’re at the heart of the matter. 
 
5. 
My favored account of what’s going on when someone challenges the standing of a hypocritical 
blamer is captured by putting this sentence into the complainant’s mouth: “What you’re saying 
may give me a reason to shape up, but your saying it doesn’t.” In order to make this sentence 
intelligible and show how it can account for standard cases of standingless blame, though, we’ll 
need take a page from Stephen Darwall (2006) and invoke the notion of a second-personal reason.  
Suppose you are trying to get me to exercise. One way you could accomplish this goal is 
simply to force it upon me, say by convincing me to go out on your boat with you, throwing me 
overboard in the middle of the lake, and then heading back to shore without me. But we’re better 
friends than that (or, perhaps, depending on your perspective, not quite as good friends as that 
would require), so you’d prefer to accomplish your goal by giving me a reason to (choose on my own 
to) exercise. Still, there are two ways you could do this. On the one hand, you could try to convince 
me by reminding me of my most recent visit to my doctor and the recommendations my doctor 
gave me, by observing out loud how cheap membership rates are at the local gym, by sending me 
links to articles demonstrating the positive effects of exercise on mental health and happiness, etc. 
If this is the path you take, then you are giving me a reason to exercise by directing my attention 
to the reasons that there are to exercise. The reasons are there independent of your attempts to get 
me to see them, though of course whether your attempt to convince me is successful will depend 
on how competent I think you are on the topic of exercise, and thus whether your report of the 
reasons really does justify my believing that there are those reasons. Whatever authority your advice 
has for me in this case, it is third-personal authority (Darwall 2006: 12). 
 Contrast this first way of giving me a reason to exercise with a second way. Imagine now 
that you are not only my friend, but also my superior officer, and we are in an appropriate military 
context. Now there is another way for you to give me a reason to exercise besides convincing me 
that it’s good for me: you can simply order me to take a few laps around the track. Independent of 
whatever reasons I already had for getting some exercise, I now have a new and different sort of 
reason, namely that you demanded that I do so. Crucial to my having this reason, of course, are 
facts about you and your authority over me, but when these facts are in place, you are able to give 
me what Darwall calls a second-personal reason. Unlike the appeal to my doctor and reputable 
journal articles about the benefits of exercise, the reason you give me when you issue an order is a 
reason that “would not exist but for [your] authority to address it through [your] command” 
(Darwall 2006: 13). Your order is a “second-personal address”, which has a “directive element” 
lacking in the mere persuasion case. As Darwall puts it (2006: 49): 
 
As I understand it, second-personal address makes a claim on the addressee’s will (and not, 
like advice, only on her beliefs about what there is reason for her to do). It presumes to tell 
another person, not just what to do in the way advice does, but also, in some way or to 
some extent, to do it. 
 
Crucially, it isn’t only in military contexts that second-personal reasons can be given. The 
phenomenon is, in fact, ubiquitous in interpersonal relationships in general. 
 12 
  Darwall’s example is of someone who is stepping on your foot, and he asks us to consider 
two ways you might give that person a reason to get off your foot. On the one hand, you could 
point out that it is painful and that the person generally has reasons not to cause pain to other 
people without compensating goods, etc. On the other hand, you could simply demand that the 
person get off your foot. In the first case, you would be directing the person’s attention to reasons 
that already exist; in the second case, you would be creating a new, second-personal, reason for the 
person to move their foot.  
Or, take the example with which we began, of my daughter and her asparagus. There are 
certainly third-personal reasons for her to eat her vegetables, and if she were older, perhaps I would 
try to persuade her by directing her attention to those reasons. But parenting a young child by 
rational persuasion is often a doomed enterprise. So, instead of trying to get one’s child to see the 
third-personal reasons, a parent might instead create a second-personal reason. This is, I submit, 
the sense in which “Because I said so” can be a perfectly legitimate answer to the child’s exasperated 
question of why should eat her vegetables.18 And the distinction between second-personal and 
third-personal reasons can also explain the child’s exasperation with the invocation of parental 
authority, since although that does answer one ‘why’ question in the vicinity, that’s not the question 
the child was asking.  
In both the parental case and the case of fellow members of the moral community, it’s 
worth asking exactly what gives us the authority to make demands of each other in this way. 
(Darwall himself eventually uses the notion of second-personal reasons to ground a general moral 
framework.) But for our purposes we need only acknowledge that we do have such authority and 
generally presume that others in our moral community have it too (perhaps that’s partly what 
constitutes the moral community in the first place). 
 Having added second-personal reasons to our conceptual repertoire, the next point to make 
is that blame, at least expressed blame, is a form of second-personal address, and as such, it typically 
attempts to address second-personal reasons to the person being blamed. Actually, the point I need 
to make is even more modest than that, since we’ve explicitly restricted our focus here to cases of 
hypocritical moral address and the associated complaint that arises in that context. My suggestion 
(which we have yet to flesh out) is that the relevant complaint should be understood in terms of 
the notion of a second-personal reason, so all I need here is the claim that when the complaint 
about standing is in order, the hypocritical blamer was engaged in an attempt to address second-
personal reasons to the person being blamed (perhaps not consciously under that description, of 
course). But what does that look like, and what sorts of reasons does expressed blame attempt to 
address? 
 Whatever your favored account of the nature of blame, it is widely accepted that expressions 
of blame (e.g., verbal rebukes or accusatory questions) are communicative; they are moves in a moral 
conversation. But what sorts of moves are they? Plausibly, they are something like demands: 
specifically, demands to explain or justify one’s behavior or, if it can’t be justified, to acknowledge 
wrongdoing and apologize. In his influential discussion of the reactive attitudes, P. F. Strawson 
explicitly connects sentiments like resentment and indignation with “an expectation of, and 
demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill” (Strawson 1962: 84). (In fact, 
Strawson makes the claim that our disposition to feel the reactive attitudes “is the making of the 
 
18 Invoking one’s parental authority in this way can, of course, be abused. Exactly when and why an invocation 
would count as an abuse of authority is an interesting question. 
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demand” (Strawson 1962: 90).) When someone apparently manifests ill-will toward you, your 
natural response is resentment that your normative expectations have been flouted.19 What I’m 
saying here is that the next move in the conversation often embodies a demand in much the same 
way. When I express my resentment to you by saying something like, “How could you?”, what I’m 
doing is addressing what we might call an answerability demand. In addressing you in this way, I 
make certain assumptions about you – minimally, that you have the capacities to engage in a moral 
conversation (see Watson 1987; Darwall 2006; McKenna 2012) – and I attribute your action to 
you in a way that makes it appropriate for me to ask you to explain yourself to me, or if you can’t, 
to apologize or otherwise make amends. I need not consciously think of myself as doing this, of 
course, but the point is that the illocutionary force of my expressed blame is to address an 
answerability demand to you (see Austin 1975; Darwall 2006: 52-55).20 
 In this way, expressed blame is often an attempt to address a second-personal reason. As 
Darwall puts it (2006: 76): 
  
If you express resentment to someone for not moving his foot from on top of yours, you 
implicitly demand that he do so. And any second-personal reason you implicitly address 
presupposes, first, that he can recognize the validity of your demand and, second, that he 
can move his foot simply by recognizing a conclusive reason for acting deriving from your 
authoritative demand (whether or not, it is worth noting, you have his sympathy). 
 
The remark in parentheses at the end is meant to emphasize the distinction between addressing 
second-personal reasons and addressing third-personal reasons. You might get the person who is 
stepping on your foot to move their foot by pointing out that he is violating certain moral norms, 
and that he cares about not being someone who violates moral norms, but this would be a purely 
third-personal form of persuasion. On the other hand, when you express your resentment, you are 
attempting to give him an additional reason to move their foot, namely that you’ve demanded that 
he do so. If he refuses, then he is not only continuing to violate a moral obligation, but he is also 
adding insult to injury by treating your demand as though it is not authoritative. 
 It is the presence of this additional reason in contexts of second-personal address that, I 
claim, allows us to make sense of the complaint about standing. Essentially, the complaint can be 
formulated as a sort of protest against the demand that the hypocritical blamer is making, via their 
expressed blame, of the person he’s blaming. The person being blamed might even say something 
like, “I don’t have to answer to you”. Unlike Bell, I don’t think this is an attempt to dismiss the 
content of the hypocritical blame. Rather, it seems like an attempt to dismiss the blamer himself. 
And the notion of a second-personal reason helps us to make sense of how a blamer can be 
dismissed without (the content of) their blame being dismissed. Whereas the content of the blame 
might, if the person who is being blamed takes it to be accurate, point to a third-personal reason 
to explain or apologize, etc., the expression of blame is also attempting to address a second-personal 
reason to explain or apologize, and the relevant complaint is that the hypocritical blamer is failing 
to address that reason successfully. So, whereas it would ordinarily add insult to injury to refuse to 
 
19 On the notion of normative expectation, see Wallace 1994. The contrast is with predictive expectations. Whereas the 
latter are beliefs about what will come to pass; the former are standards that we hold others to. 
20 The notion of answerability looms large in the literature on moral responsibility, and is sometimes thought to be 
the central notion. See, for example, Smith 2015. For the view that answerability cannot capture everything we want 
from a theory of responsibility, see Shoemaker 2015. Nothing I say in this paper hinges on this dispute. 
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explain yourself to someone who is blaming you; in the case of hypocritical blame, refusing the 
answerability demand embodied in the expressed blame is not inappropriate. 
 Gary Watson gives a nice description of the sort of normative infelicity at issue, in a 
discussion of whether it makes sense to blame psychopaths, individuals who by hypothesis are not 
able to grasp moral reasons. Watson points out that there are two ways that an attempt to address 
a second-personal reason might misfire: on the one hand, the addressee may not have the 
competence to recognize the second-personal authority of the person addressing the demand. 
This, Watson thinks, is what makes blaming psychopaths inappropriate. But for the sake of 
contrast, Watson also describes the other type of misfire, which is when the person attempting to 
address the second-personal reason lacks the authority to do so. Watson says (2011: 314-315): 
  
I can legitimately require others to do things only if they have good reasons to act in this 
way because I have required it. In other words, it is normatively infelicitous to make 
demands of people who have no good reasons to regard the demanding as legitimate. To 
illustrate, consider the infelicity of my ordering you not to park on the public street in front 
of my house, when I have no authority to control this space. Whether or not you have any 
reasons to refrain from parking in that spot, my telling you not to is not among them. I 
have presumed a power I do not have.  
 
This, essentially, is what I’m suggesting happens when the person who is hypocritically blamed 
lodges a complaint about standing. To paraphrase Watson: whether or not the person being 
blamed has any reasons to apologize or explain himself, the fact that the hypocritical blamer is 
(implicitly) demanding that he do so is not among their reasons for doing so. It is precisely in this 
sense that the hypocrite has lost their moral voice.21  
 
6. 
To strengthen my argument that what constitutes the hypocrite’s lack of standing is their inability 
to address second-personal reasons, let me briefly consider another puzzle about hypocrisy that’s 
in the same neighborhood. It’s this: hypocrisy can seem to both undermine and also enhance one’s 
standing in a moral conversation. Although the question we have been focusing on is, “Who are 
you to say that to me?”, often there seems to be a perfectly good answer to that question, namely, 
“Someone who has made the same mistakes.” And doesn’t that perfectly good answer (if true, and 
sincere, etc.) serve to cure the hypocrite of their moral laryngitis? I suspect that this thought is 
what is driving the intuitions of so many theorists (including Wallace from above) who say that as 
 
21 Though I don’t have space to explore it here, I suspect there will be similar standing norms that apply to praise, 
and those will work in a similar way. Think, for example, of the political candidate who has carefully considered 
whether to support a particular policy on immigration, and who has arrived at the conclusion that they should 
indeed support it, despite how controversial it is. Then they receive a letter from a constituent who also favors the 
policy, but who favors it for what are clearly racist reasons. In this letter, the constituent urges the candidate to vote 
in favor of the policy, and in fact the candidate does later vote in favor of the policy. But the candidate might 
reasonably want to distance themselves from this particular constituent, despite the fact that they favor the same 
policy. The candidate might do this by saying (if only to themselves): yes, I voted for the policy, but not because this 
constituent asked me to. 
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long as the hypocrite also blames himself, no complaint about standing can arise.22 So, somehow a 
hypocrite seems simultaneously to be last person who should address the moral faults of others 
(since they are no better), but also the person who is most well-placed to address the moral faults 
of others (since they can empathize and perhaps encourage reform). How is the hypocrite’s voice 
both silenced and also amplified, seemingly at the same time? 
 The obvious resolution here is to distinguish between blame and advice. A hypocrite is the 
last person who should be blaming (because of issues of standing), but also perhaps the person who 
is the most well-placed to offer advice (because they’ve been through the same thing before). 
What’s perhaps less obvious is how exactly blame and advice differ such that a hypocrite can be 
barred from one and well-suited for the other. Taking a cue from the above discussion, it seems 
like we can articulate the difference by distinguishing the type of reason that each activity intends 
to convey. Put simply, whereas advice-giving is an activity that merely involves pointing to third-
personal reasons for action, blaming is an activity that involves attempting to address second-
personal reasons, as well. So, we might draw the distinction between blame and advice by 
distinguishing between practical standing and epistemic standing. To address a second-personal 
reason successfully, you need practical standing, which is undermined by hypocrisy (or, more 
precisely, its potential manifestation in blame). But to address a third-personal reason successfully, 
you just need epistemic standing, which is enhanced by experience.23 
 Of course, in practice the distinction between (expressed) blame and (voiced) advice is 
blurry. Take, for example, my partner’s reaction upon hearing me recite the classic Peter Singer 
argument for the conclusion that we ought to give a lot of our money away. Her immediate 
response was, “Well how much does he give away?” At first I was inclined to think that this 
question was essentially an inappropriate ad hominem against Singer’s argument, and I (quite 
arrogantly) tried to explain to my (non-philosopher) partner that there’s a difference between what 
an argument says, on the one hand, and who is saying it, on the other. Forget that the argument 
was concocted by Peter Singer, I said, and just imagine that you found it in a book written 
anonymously. But she wasn’t convinced, and thought that such a proposed separation of author 
and argument was artificial. And, upon further reflection, I think my partner and I are both right. 
(Which means, yes, that she was right.) How can that be? 
 Having been trained in the world of professional philosophy, I have learned to “hear” the 
conclusions of arguments, even moral arguments, as mere assertions about how the impersonal 
facts stand. So, when I read Peter Singer telling us what we ought to do, I take him to be offering 
something like moral advice, merely pointing to third-personal reasons that we all have for giving 
more of our money away. My partner, on the other hand, hears the conclusion of his argument as 
blame (or, as an attempt to pass judgment on his audience). And it’s this way of construing the 
argument (as blame) that makes her inquiry into his hypocrisy completely in order. Rebecca Kukla 
and Mark Lance put this point nicely (2009: 109): 
 
22 In fact, these theorists may want to say that if the hypocrite also blames himself, then they aren’t a hypocrite after 
all. Though it would take us too far afield to explore the details, I’m inclined to think that performing actions with 
conflicting meaning can be enough for one to count as a hypocrite even if neither action conflicts with the mental 
states of the agent at the time each action is performed. This would be a purely behavioral hypocrisy, perhaps, but 
hypocrisy nonetheless. Thanks to Philip Swenson here. 
23 As Philip Swenson has pointed out to me in personal correspondence, giving advice while lacking relevant 
experience seems most problematic in cases where the advice is against some course of action, rather than in favor of 
some course of action. It’s an interesting question why there should be this asymmetry. 
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In practice, it is often hard not to smuggle a subtle holding into a second-personal 
prescriptive; when I point out an ‘ought’ to someone I am almost inevitably heard as 
requesting that she obey it, rather than as merely exhibiting its salience so that it can do its 
own normative work.  
 
Statements that begin with the words ‘you ought’ may simply be intended as moral advice, but 
when they are said out loud – tone of voice, facial expression, and body language are often crucial 
here, too – they can easily seem like attempts to address answerability demands (hence, second-
personal reasons) to the hearer. Though the distinction is difficult to maintain in practice, it’s 
nevertheless an important one for helping us to understand the way in which hypocrisy can affect 
the character of a moral conversation. Again, my proposal is that the trouble with hypocrisy is best 
understood in terms of the activity of addressing second-personal reasons. 
 
7. 
Even if the proposal is right – that is, even if what’s lost when a hypocrite loses the standing to 
blame is the ability to successfully address second-personal reasons via their expressed blame – an 
important question still remains unanswered, namely: how does it work? The question we’ve been 
focusing on is about the content of the complaint about standing, but another good question is 
about the mechanism by which the standing is lost, when it’s lost. Granted that having done similar 
things disables you from being able successfully to address second-personal reasons via expressed 
blame, how does it do this? 
 I confess not to have an answer to this question, but in closing let me consider two 
(admittedly obscure) possibilities. The first comes from Darwall, who takes the second-personal 
nature of blame to show that when we blame others, we must presuppose that the objects of our 
blame themselves have second-personal competence and are able to “hold themselves responsible 
by self-addressed demands from a perspective that we and they share” (Darwall 2006: 112). 
Darwall intends this to be a point about what we must assume about each other when we attempt 
to address second-personal reasons to each other. In particular, we must assume that others have 
certain capacities. Darwall thus attempts to derive, in Strawsonian fashion, the conditions of 
morally responsible agency from the presuppositions of second-personal address. But there’s 
something else that we might squeeze out of Darwall’s remarks here. 
 Even supposing that an addressee has the capacity for appreciating the notions of second-
personal authority and second-personal reasons, something might still be missing, namely a 
coherent “perspective that we and they share”. Perhaps in the case of hypocritical moral address, 
there is no such perspective. As the person being blamed, your blame only conveys a second-
personal reason if I can take up your perspective and address the reason to myself.24 But when you 
are blaming me hypocritically, it’s not clear that there is even a coherent perspective for me to “take 
up” (insofar as hypocrisy is a form of inconsistency and hence is rationally criticizable), so one of 
the presuppositions of successful second-personal address may be missing. To make good on this 
suggestion, we’d have to look more closely at the nature of hypocrisy, and the precise sense in 
which rationality is built into the second-personal perspective. 
 
24 Guilt is also a form of second-personal address, albeit to oneself. See Darwall 2006: 72. 
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 The other relatively obscure suggestion for understanding the mechanism by which 
hypocrisy might undermine standing is inspired by a remark made by Kukla and Lance, who point 
out that “...only beings who are recognized as members of a discursive community count as 
normative subjects capable of having agent-relative commitments and entitlements” (2009: 193). 
Here the emphasis is on the social dimension of language and reason-giving, and perhaps there 
will also be an irreducibly social element to determining who has the authority to address second-
personal reasons for action, as well. Perhaps, in fact, our refusal to allow hypocrites a moral voice 
is the very thing that silences them.25  
 
8. 
Although invoking second-personal reasons helps us to make progress on understanding the 
standing to blame, much remains up in the air. Recall, for example, that I have explicitly restricted 
my focus to cases of expressed blame, and even then, to cases of hypocritical moral address. There are 
many other responses to wrongdoing that plausibly count as blaming responses, generally speaking, 
and there are many other ways one can lose one’s standing to blame than by being a hypocrite. A 
full analysis of the standing to blame will therefore be broader in scope than what I have undertaken 
here. But I think the account offered here of what constitutes lack of standing in the case of 
hypocritical moral address is a step in the right direction. Hypocritical moral address may be 
unfitting, morally wrong, and pointless, but none of those things best explains the force of the 
complaint about standing. Rather, that complaint is about who has to answer to whom (and hence 
about who can legitimately demand answers from whom). And that means that discussions about 
standing are going to have to take seriously the nature and presuppositions of second-personal 
address.  
 
25 It might be instructive here also to consider other contexts in which we can legitimately refuse an answerability 
demand. For example, in a court of law, a witness need not answer certain questions posed to them if the lawyer who 
poses the question has violated certain courtroom procedures. Of course, analogizing moral blame with institutional 
blame has limitations. See, for example, Shoemaker 2013.  
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